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Abstract
A number has the “collective” property if the number is the greatest lower bound of a bounded,
strictly decreasing sequence on the real line. We prove that numbers with the collective property
constitute an empty set.
The properties of numbers for counting, calculating, or measuring are conceivable without consid-
ering “all numbers”. In mainstream mathematics, “all numbers” or “numbers as a whole” is a notion
formulated based on the notion of “set”, and a number also has some “collective” properties different
from the properties for counting, calculating, and measuring. A specific collective property of a number
is necessary to the definition of “bounded, strictly decreasing sequence”. To define “bounded, strictly
decreasing sequence”, one has to define a number, which is not a term of the sequence, as the greatest
lower bound of the sequence. The property of the number as the greatest lower bound may not be nec-
essary when the number is used for counting, calculating or measuring. In the following, the collective
property of a number means “the number is the greatest lower bound of a bounded, strictly decreasing
sequence on the real line”.
Due to the failure to prove the consistency of any formal system involving numbers with the collective
property [5], and also due to the fact that the definition of the greatest lower bound is circular and hence
is not on a logically secure ground [6, 8], in mainstream mathematics, one has to accept the collective
property based on a philosophical belief (realism or Platonism). As a sharp contrast, constructive
mathematicians reject the collective property [1, 2, 3, 4, 8]. However, the rejection is also based on a
philosophical belief (constructivism or intuitivism), perhaps for lack of a convincing way to argue against
the collective property mathematically. By proving the following theorem, we present a mathematical
refutation of the collective property. In other words, we prove that numbers with the collective property
constitute an empty set and hence are devoid of any meaning in mathematics.
Theorem 1 Denote by E a bounded set consisting of all terms of an arbitrarily given, strictly decreasing
sequence (with a greatest lower bound a 6∈ E) on the real line. The above definition of E implies a
contradiction.
Proof: For each point x ∈ (−∞,∞), define
∗The corresponding author.
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f(x) =
{
1, x ∈ E;
0, otherwise.
(1)
By (1), f(x) = 0 does not hold for all x. Let P (x) represent “f(z) = 0 for each z ≤ x”. Let v be a
real-valued variable with the following properties. (I) v assumes values greater than or equal to x with
P (x) in the order from left to right as the points appear on the real line. (II) In the order mentioned
in (I), the set of values of v may have a last element defined by a condition, and the value of v can be
any point less than or equal to the last value. (III) If v does not have a last value, then the value of v
can be any point on the real line. If v runs from any x0 with P (x0) towards the right, i.e., if v increases
from x0, then v reaches eventually a unique x1 with f(x1) = 1 and f(x) = 0 for each x < x1. To see
this, we define v|x′ → x′′ to mean “if P (x′) holds, then let v take on each x with x ≥ x′ as its value,
and let x′′ be the last value of v if f(v) = 1 where the value of v is x′′”. Note the difference between
f(v) = 1 as the condition to define the last value of v and f(x) = 1, where x is a point in E.
Assume P (x′) holds. Then v|x′ → x′′ determines a nonempty subset of values of v. Denying “x′′
is the last value of v” amounts to negating “f(v) = 1 where the value of v is x′′” in the definition of
v|x′ → x′′. The negation asserts “f(v) = 0 where the value of v can be any x ≥ x′”. This contradicts
(1). Since x′′ is a value of v, no x with x < x′′ is the last value of v. So f(v) = 0 where the value
of v can be any x < x′′. In other words, x′′ is unique. The uniqueness of x′′ is independent of x′
so long as P (x′) holds. By the definition of v|x′ → x′′, given P (x′), if v|x′ → x′′, and if v|x′ → y′′,
then x′′ = y′′. Consider two arbitrarily given points x′ and y′ with x′ 6= y′, P (x′), P (y′), v|x′ → x′′,
and v|y′ → y′′. If x′′ 6= y′′, then without loss of generality, assume y′ < x′ < x′′ < y′′, which implies
v|y′ → x′′. This contradicts v|y′ → y′′. So x′′ = y′′. Consequently, for all x with P (x), there is a unique
x1 with v|x→ x1.
The above argument has a clear physical meaning. Negating the argument then leads to an absurdity.
Let r represent the position of a point particle moving along the real line towards the right from an
initial position x0 with P (x0). The particle moves at r if and only if P (r) holds, i.e., the speed of the
particle at r is positive if and only if P (r) holds. Then the particle stops at x1 with f(x1) = 1 and
never moves again. If this is not the case, then the particle either is motionless with a positive speed,
or moves at a speed equal to 0. This violates the basic physical law and hence is absurd.
If x1 does not exist, then v runs towards ∞, which implies f(x) = 0 at each x. This contradicts (1)
as we have shown already. However, if x1 exists, then x1 = minE ∈ E, which contradicts the definition
of E. We see a contradiction in either case above. Q.E.D.
Clearly, if we detach the collective property from numbers, then any contradiction or absurdity
caused by the collective property disappears. The collective property comes into being by the definition
of the greatest lower bound of E. The contradiction implied by the definition of E suggests that
the definition of the greatest lower bound is problematic. This is indeed the case. The definition of
the greatest lower bound is circular [6, 8], and violates Russell’s vicious circle principle: No totality
can contain members defined in terms of the totality itself [7]. Definitions violating this principle
are called non-predicative (or impredicative). According to Russell, non-predicative definitions cause
contradictions, such as the well-known Russell’s paradox [6]. To avoid contradictions, Russell proposed
the vicious circle principle. Now let us take a look at the definition of the greatest lower bound.
A real number y is a lower bound of an infinite set S of real numbers, if y ≤ x for each x in S. Let L
be the set of all lower bounds of S. The greatest lower bound l of S is a member of L with l ≥ y for each
y in L. But l may not necessarily be in S. Clearly, the definition of l is circular and non-predicative: To
define l, one has to define a totality L first, in which l itself is a member. The contradiction implied by
E is directly due to the circular, non-predicative definition of the greatest lower bound, which attaches
the collective property to a point a 6∈ E, and hence excludes minE from E. In fact, the definition of
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E requires one to exclude minE from E. Achieved by the circular, non-predicative definition of the
greatest lower bound, such exclusion is logically invalid [6, 7, 8]. As shown below, the definition of the
greatest lower bound of E is merely a result of an artificial choice rather than a logical necessity. The
choice also causes an absurdity.
Denote by N(x) the number of different values taken on by f on (−∞, x], and N ′(x) the number of
different values taken on by f on (−∞, x). Both N and N ′ are non-decreasing functions on (−∞,∞).
If f takes on only one value on (−∞, x], then N(x) = N ′(x) = 1. For any x ∈ (−∞,∞), N(x) ≥ N ′(x).
Write ∆N(x) = N(x)−N ′(x). So
N(x) = N ′(x) + ∆N(x) (2)
with
lim
x→−∞
N(x) = 1. (3)
Since f has only two different values, ∆N(x) ∈ {0, 1}.
For each x ∈ (−∞,∞), all eligible (i.e., consistent with (2) and (3)) combinations ofN ′(x),max{f(y) :
y < x},∆N(x), N (x), and max{f(y) : y ≥ x} give the conditions A(x), B(x), C(x) and D(x) below,
such that either (−∞,∞) = {x : A(x)} or (−∞,∞) = {x : B(x)} ∪ {x : C(x)} ∪ {x : D(x)}.
N ′(x) max{f(y) : y < x} ∆N(x) N(x) max{f(y) : y ≥ x}
A(x) 1 0 0 1 0
B(x) 1 0 0 1 1
C(x) 1 0 1 2 1
D(x) 2 1 0 2 1
If {x : A(x)} = (−∞,∞), then {x : B(x)} = {x : C(x)} = {x : D(x)} = ∅. In other words,
0 is the only value of f . This is prohibited by (1). Negating “{x : A(x)} = (−∞,∞)”, we obtain
{x : B(x)} ∪ {x : C(x)} ∪ {x : D(x)} = (−∞,∞), where none of {x : B(x)}, {x : C(x)}, and {x : D(x)}
is empty. As can be readily seen, {x : B(x)} = (−∞, x1), {x : C(x)} = {x1}, and {x : D(x)} = (x1,∞)
with ∆N(x1) = 1.
Consider two arbitrarily given points x0 < x
′ with N(x′) > N(x0). We say “N increases” if there
are points y < x such that N(y) < N(x). We say “N increases at x” if N(x) > N(y) for any y < x.
Since N increases on [x0, x
′], N increases at a unique x1 ∈ [x0, x
′], which implies ∆N(x1) = 1. The
increase in N can then be expressed by
2 = N(x′) = N(x0) +
∫
∞
−∞
δ(x − x1)dx = 1 + 1
where δ is the Dirac delta function.
In mainstream mathematics, one denies that the negation of “{x : A(x)} = (−∞,∞)” is “{x :
B(x)} ∪ {x : C(x)} ∪ {x : D(x)} = (−∞,∞) with nonempty {x : B(x)}, {x : C(x)}, and {x : D(x)}”
by choosing, without any logically justified reason, to negate “∆N(x1) = 1”. The denial implies not
only the definition of the greatest lower bound of E but also an absurdity: “N does not increase at any
point on the real line and N increases”. Using the definition of the greatest lower bound of E to explain
away the absurdity is logically invalid.
Actually, any formal definition or informal notion of even {n : n = 1, 2, · · ·} is circular and non-
predicative [9, 10]. A formal definition or informal notion of {n : n = 1, 2, · · ·} is the basis of mainstream
mathematics. Again, in mainstream mathematics, the conception of {n : n = 1, 2, · · ·} is not on a
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logically secure ground, and the only reason for one to accept {n : n = 1, 2, · · ·} is a philosophical belief
[9].
Let P1(E) stand for “E is a bounded, strictly decreasing sequence on the real line”, P2(1/N) for
“1/N is {1/n : n = 1, 2, · · ·} or any infinite subset of {1/n : n = 1, 2, · · ·}”, and P3(N) for “N is
{n : n = 1, 2, · · ·} or any infinite subset of {n : n = 1, 2, · · ·}”. The following results are immediate from
Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 (i) {E : P1(E)} = ∅, which implies (with E = {1/n : n = 1, 2, · · ·}) {1/N : P2(1/N)} = ∅,
and (due to the correspondence between {1/n : n = 1, 2, · · ·} and {n : n = 1, 2, · · ·}) {N : P3(N)} = ∅.
(ii) {x : x is a number with the collective property} = ∅.
By Corollary 1, {n : n = 1, 2, · · ·} is meaningless, though {1, 2, · · · , n} is meaningful for any given
positive integer n. Also by Corollary 1, no number has the collective property. In other words, the
definition of the greatest lower bound defines a concept without any instance. In particular, defining
numbers based on the collective property, such as the definition of irrational numbers, actually defines
nothing. Consequently, mathematical reasoning based on a number system with the collective property
may yield concepts with an empty set of instances and hence may be misleading. Nevertheless, any
number with a decimal expression of a finite length still possesses the properties for counting, calculating
and measuring. As shown by constructive mathematics, numbers without the collective property are
sufficient for scientific and engineering applications.
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